Approaches and practices in the prevention of radicalisation in France
2018-2019
Approaches and practices in the prevention of radicalisation in France [2018-2019]

PART 1 • STUDY FRAMEWORK
A. Objective
B. Methodology
C. Limits
D. Clarifications
E. Terminology
   1. Definition of radicalisation
   2. Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention

PART 2 • PUBLIC POLICIES FROM 2014 TO 2019
A. Before 2015: the beginnings of combating radicalisation, security paradigm and secondary prevention
   1. A slow development of the security paradigm prior to the 2015 attacks
   2. The first measures for the prevention of radicalisation
B. 2015-2017: radicalisation as a social problem
   1. Social cohesion as a defence against radicalisation
   2. The search for the miracle solution to radicalisation
   3. PART, a second plan combating radicalisation and terrorism
C. 2018-2019: two distinct plans for preventing and combating terrorism
   1. 2018: the plan “Prevent to protect”
   2. Today, preventing radicalisation in the face of “hybrid” profiles
   3. Public funds to support citizen initiatives against radicalisation

PART 3 • THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES BY THE WIDER ASSOCIATIVE SECTOR
A. An environment with movable boundaries
   1. The prevention of radicalisation sector is difficult to define
   2. Estimated figures are difficult to obtain
B. Combating discrimination and educating on republican values, some common practices
C. Blind spots and emerging trends
   1. Emerging trends
   2. Blind spots
D. Abandoned practices

PART 4 • THE RESEARCH AND ACADEMIC SECTOR
A. A windfall for research
   1. Political, media and public opinion interest in this research
   2. The creation of COSPRAD (Scientific Council for Radicalisation Processes)
   3. The opening of 11,000 FSPRT files (Database for the processing of alerts to prevent radicalisation) to researchers: an interesting source
   4. Thesis funding
B. Momentum in radicalisation research in 2018-2019
   1. Abundant scientific publications
   2. Professionalising of research on radicalisation
   3. An explosion of think tanks and the appearance of “do tanks”
   4. A readiness to offer training on the issues in radicalisation
C. The impact of this momentum for research
   1. Multidisciplinary experiences
   2. A risk of reaching saturation point?
   3. Blind spots and emerging trends

PART 5 • VIEWS FROM ABROAD
A. Different terminology
B. A world tour of characteristics
C. What others are doing that we aren’t
D. France seen from abroad

Conclusions and recommendations

Annexes
- List of projects supported by the Fonds du 11 janvier 2015-2019
- List and presentation of the members of the Fonds du 11 janvier
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

This research and documentary analysis work has been fuelled and enriched by 7 interviews with individuals with a role or experience giving them a sufficiently broad view of the issues dealt with here. These are, in chronological order of interview:

- Muriel Domenach: Secretary-general of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime and Radicalisation (CIPDR);
- Marc Hecker: Director of publications of the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI);
- Lydia Ruprecht: Programme Manager for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Education on Global Citizenship and Peace with UNESCO, Education sector;
- Joanna Barasz: Deputy delegate of the Interministerial Delegation to Combat Racism, Anti-Semitism and LGBT hate crimes (DILCRAH);
- Michel Wieviorka: Sociologist, President of the Fondation des Sciences de l’Homme, Director of studies at EHESS (School of Advanced Studies in Social Sciences), member of the scientific council of DILCRAH;
- Rachid Benzine: Islamic and political scientist, author of “Lettre à Nour”;
- Sofia Koller: Research fellow on the project “Counter terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism” to the German Council on Foreign Relations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank Marion Munch, the student who assisted us during this mission, for her precious contribution in the research and documentary analysis, notetaking in meetings and interviews as well as in the preparation of this report, that owes a lot to her diligence.
2019 marks the end of a cycle in the prevention of radicalisation in France. At the time this study was completed, we were learning that the Secretary General of the CIPDR, Muriel Domenach, was leaving her position after a 3-year term. These were 3 crucial years in the subject, marked by mistakes, experiments, trial and error, abandoning and a move towards professionalisation by the public authorities as well as civil society. And now what will the future be? While the prevention of radicalisation in France has long consisted of preventing young people from going to Syria, the attack on the police headquarters in Paris on 3 October shows how far the aim of this work needs to adapt to the end of the Islamic State in its state form. Furthermore, the violent action by individuals from the far right against a mosque in Christchurch on 15 March and against a synagogue in Germany on 9 October, mean a shift in the way the very scope of radicalisation is conceived of and presented by public policies and the media.

If we have chosen an analysis at one given moment in time on approaches and practices in the prevention of radicalisation, then this was because the subject is in constant evolution and current events can turn it completely upside down. Completely? Only in theory, as the achievements from experiences over the last few years have firmly anchored a certain number of actors, approaches and practices who have become enshrined in the landscape (or have permanently left it).

In our view, there are numerous lessons to be learned, and they are not necessarily those we would imagine.

This is certainly not the only study on the subject, but may be the only one that chooses to rove certain issues at the level of so many actors in the prevention of radicalisation: public authorities and civil society as well as the research and academic sector, all of which is modestly contrasted with practices in other countries.

This study, ordered by the Fonds du 11 janvier, is in the context of a process of reflection after 5 years of the fund’s existence; a unique experience of its kind. In an immediate response to the terrorist attacks of January 2015, and so as to “transform the national momentum of the events of 11 January into tangible action”, around ten foundations came together with the aim of supporting initiatives in the civil society, in favour of citizenship and respect for others, intercultural dialogue, knowledge of religion, cohesion and coexistence, paying particular attention to the training of young people in critical thinking and the prevention of violence.

5 years after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Hypercasher, the Fund sought this state of play in order to identify and analyse trends: major, minor, abandoned, emerging, still to come, blind spots and the main actors in the prevention of radicalisation; with all of this then compared with the approaches in other countries.

This is neither an exhaustive list of what occurs in the area of prevention of radicalisation, nor a directory of the actors or a guide to good practices. It is more a tool to help financiers and decision-makers in their reflection on the subject, as well as to help actors in the prevention of radicalisation to position themselves and position their practices in an area that is in constant evolution.
A. Objective

Identifying and analysing the major, minor, abandoned, emerging, coming trends, the blind spots and main actors in the prevention of radicalisation in France today; then contrasting these with the approaches in other countries.

B. Methodology

This study is based on research and documentary analysis, fuelled and enriched by individual interviews with experts on the subject (list on page 5) as well as progress meetings with the president and manager of Fonds du 11 janvier, Jean-Marie Destrée and Anne Lescot.

We have chosen to draw as much as possible on what already exists regarding the typologies and definitions so as not to reinvent everything, except where that seemed indispensable.

In order to frame this work within the scope of the Fonds du 11 janvier, a certain number of parameters were defined beforehand with the Fund’s executive committee, which then served as a steering committee. It was thus decided to focus on education and on the associative sector. We have also voluntarily minimised the analysis of certain topics (mental health) and excluded certain populations or topics that were too far from the aims of the Fund (prevention of radicalisation in companies, for example). Finally, it was decided that the study should concentrate on primary prevention actions on radicalisation, i.e. attacking the prior causes of radicalisation.

The subject is so ever-changing that we decided on a short and recent study period (2018-2019), without strict boundaries, as some actors work over a calendar year, some over a scholastic year (academic sector), and others (public policies) over several years.

C. Limits

The limits to this work should be specified here, partly linked to the subject:

- the lack of a common evaluation framework for effective comparison;
- the lack of a universally accepted definition of the scope of radicalisation;
- numerous actors contribute to the prevention of radicalisation without asserting it, while others assert it without always contributing to it.
D. Clarifications

There should also be a warning against some potential bias when reading this report. This is not an exhaustive list of what happens in the area of prevention of radicalisation, nor is it a directory of actors or a guide to good practices.

A comprehensive look at the subject would require considerable means for a result that would be quite close to this report, but we apologise in advance for any omissions or errors. We have based this work on in-depth reading of reports and recent reference work, meetings and our own 20 years of experience in the associative sector as well as in combating discrimination, including 4 years as a trainer in the prevention of radicalisation itself.

Furthermore, when we talk about major trends, there is no judgement as to the impact of these approaches. Major trend does not mean the most effective: many actors were mainly engaged in actions around secularism or de-radicalisation before abandoning them, as these major trends were ineffective or lower priority. On the contrary, we think that actions in the field over a long term, that are minor and slip under the radar, carried out by local actors often small in size, can have a major impact.

E. Terminology

1. Definition of radicalisation

There are numerous definitions of radicalisation and this diversity has given rise to aggressive debates in university, media and political environments.

In its current usage, the concept of radicalisation has been increasingly used since the terrorists attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, and exponentially in France since the attacks by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse in 2012, and the young people leaving for “Jihad” in Syria and Iraq in the same year.

One of the elements of debate is, for example, the position of religion, illustrated by the debate between political scientists Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy (“radicalisation of Islam”, versus “islamisation of radicality”). For some, like sociologist Michel Wieviorka, the term radicalisation also divides researchers as it can tend to confine this phenomenon to its psychological dimension. Without affirming that there is a consensus today on the definition of radicalisation, the position of religion is now less central in this definition than in the wake of the 2015 attacks. Radicalisation is, above all, considered as the convergence between an extremist ideology (political, social, religious, etc.) and a recourse to violence1.

The difficulty of agreeing on a definition is one of the debate issues that led le Fonds du 11 janvier to request this report. We suggest using the CIPDR definition, that uses sociologist

Farhad Khosrokhavar’s definition (2014), and is also used by a large number of people and institutions working on radicalisation: “Radicalisation is a process by which an individual or a group adopts a violent form of action, directly linked to an extremist ideology with political, social or religious content that contests the established order on a political, social or cultural level.”

2. Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention

This study is essentially based on primary prevention, that we define here according to sociologist Romain Sèze as any action where: “the aim is to reduce the social vulnerabilities expected to encourage the route to radicality”. Secondary prevention is “when the action is aimed at individuals identified as being in the process of radicalisation and tertiary prevention aims at preventing a reoccurrence”.

PART 2 • PUBLIC POLICIES BETWEEN 2014 AND 2018

Current public policies in prevention of radicalisation are a part of the PNPR (National Plan to Prevent Radicalisation), in effect since 23 February 2018. This plan follows several years of experiments and trial and error that we will describe here.

We can distinguish three phases in public radicalisation policy: before 2015 the focus was on security without a developed preventive aspect. Following the 2015 attacks, radicalisation was increasingly thought of as a social problem and the urgency of the situation then brought the government to look for rapidly effective solutions. Despite this urgency, there was a clear readiness to link prevention (long term) and repression (short term), even though this readiness was not always effective. Thus, in the aftermath of the attacks in January 2015, the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, declared: “We have always looked to reconcile and to articulate the administrative and legal responses along three main lines: widening the preventive framework, developing new investigation methods and, finally, hardening the

---


4. R. Sèze adds: “the aim is to act beforehand to remedy social vulnerabilities that would facilitate this massive attraction for Jihad, for example by strengthening the social link or by circulating a counter-narrative”, (www.acteurspublics.com/2017/10/06/romain-seze-il-manque-une-politique-d-ensemble-coherente-contre-la-radicalisation).

criminal response⁶”, or even: “This policy of prevention, of precaution, must be complemented by severe repression⁷.”

Unfortunately, the attacks that marked 2015 and 2016 and particularly those of 13 November 2015 in Paris and 14 July 2016 in Nice, have caused the prevention narrative to practically disappear in favour of repression.

Since 2018-2019, two successive plans have made prevention a priority in combating radicalisation and terrorism.

**A. Before 2015: the beginnings of combating radicalisation in France, security paradigm and secondary prevention**

1. A slow development of the security paradigm prior to the 2015 terrorist attacks

Prior to the 2015 attacks, anti-terrorist policy in France was expressed around a security paradigm and prevention of radicalisation was absent from public policies. It had, however, been at the heart of anti-terrorist policy in many countries for decades, but in France, combating terrorism remained the work of justice and security institutions in the 2010s and was solely based on repression.

It was only in 2012 that radicalisation started emerging as a public issue. The terrorist killings committed by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse and Montauban, as well as the proliferation of young French people leaving for “Jihad” in Syria and Iraq, marked a turning point in the fight against terrorism. The public authorities then turned towards the prevention of radicalisation: “The government realised that the security and justice institutions could not solve everything alone: on the one hand because there were too many people to watch, and on the other because many cases were not enforceable. The government then decided to take prior action and to carry out preventive action. The traditionally repressive response from the State was then doubled up with preventive actions, assesses the sociologist Romain Sèze⁸.

2. The first measures in the prevention of radicalisation

Preventive measures from spring 2014

On 23 April 2014, a first plan to combat violent radicalisation and terrorist networks (PLAT, the counter-terrorist plan) was presented by Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, at

---

⁶. Declaration by Mr Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior, on the link between administrative and legal action in the fight against Jihadist terrorism, at the Ecole Militaire (Paris) on 7 November 2016 : www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-actualites/2016-Actualites/Lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-et-prevention-de-la-radicalisation-reunion-des-prefets-et-des-procureurs
⁷. Remarks made at the CRIF (Representative Council of Jewish Institutions) Rhône-Alpes dinner on 29 January 2015.
the Council of Ministers. Including 22 measures, this plan was aimed at dismantling Jihadist networks, banning travel for individuals considered to be a threat, strengthening international cooperation to combat terrorism and combat the circulation of illegal material on social networks. The plan reads: “A solely repressive action will in no way suffice to curb this phenomenon. Preventive actions and actions aimed at contradicting hate preachers will also be implemented”: the plan also foresees the individualised handling of people in the process of becoming radicalised, the creation of a National centre for counselling and family guidance and an experimental provision for reintegration. Training on radicalisation was offered to the public officials concerned. The plan also indicates that “particular attention will be paid to the prison environment”.

A circular to the prefects on 29 April 2014, “Prevention of radicalisation and family support”, makes the SG-CIPD (General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime) responsible for coordinating prevention of radicalisation across the whole territory. It was also in charge of gathering and sharing good practices with the various actors. What is more, the circular provides for support to families where a young person is in the process of becoming radicalised via a telephone platform assigned to UCLA T (Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit), to report individuals who are becoming or are already radicalised.

The FIPD (Interministerial Crime Prevention Fund) was made responsible for funding actions on prevention of radicalisation. The projects aimed at preventing radicalisation were multiplying and the government launched a freephone number as well as an online reporting form in April 2014.

On 13 November 2014, a law strengthened the administrative provisions in the fight against terrorism: it created the individual terrorist offence and strengthened the repression of glorification and incitement to terrorism. It also allowed individuals suspected of wanting to join the Islamic State to be banned from leaving the territory, as well as blocking and removing websites that glorify terrorism.

On the eve of the attacks in January 2015, there was primarily an arsenal of secondary prevention provisions in place.

---

11. Ibid.
13. For more information, see the timeline: www.gouvernement.fr/action/la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme. See also www.courrierdesmaires.fr/57036/radicalisation-un-plan-national-pour-reperer-et%E2%80%AFprendre-en-chARGE-LES-INDIVIDUS/.
B. 2015-2017: radicalisation as a social problem

1. Social cohesion as a defence against radicalisation

Following the attacks in January 2015, 60 million euros were set aside by the government until 2018, for prevention and combating terrorism by local actors and 100 million over the same period of 3 years (2015-2018) for the (second) Interministerial Plan to Combat Racism and Anti-Semitism, led by the Interministerial Delegation to combat Racism, Anti-Semitism and LGBT hate crimes (DILCRAH).

10 months later, in the wake of the attacks of 13 November 2015, the repressive measures continued: on 14 November, a state of emergency was declared for 3 months and was extended on 16 November. The Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, presented a draft constitutional law on 23 December for protection of the Nation, relating to the state of emergency and to strip nationality from dual nationals born in France and convicted of terrorist crimes, provoking controversy on a national scale. On 3 June 2016, a law was enacted to strengthen the fight against organised crime and terrorism, that allowed prosecutors and magistrates the use of similar investigation techniques to intelligence services and that introduced administrative controls on French citizens returning from “Jihad”. What is more, the law of 21 July 2016 allowed precautionary identity checks.

However, following the attacks in 2015, the public authorities also insisted on the preventive aspect, as radicalisation was no longer considered as a security issue: it also appeared to be a social problem. A major mobilisation of the public authorities and the civil society was therefore necessary to strengthen national unity. Between 7 and 11 January 2015, the President of the Republic received representatives of all political groups, except the National Front, and on 11 January, France had its biggest rally in modern history with more than 4 million people demonstrating across the country and 44 country leaders at the head of the Paris procession.

The public authorities then realised that radicalisation was a symptom of a crisis of values in our society, based on coexistence. The solution would be found, as a result, in the strengthening of social cohesion: the emphasis was therefore placed on primary prevention. The idea was that repairing social fractures would be an effective defence against radicalisation. The President of the Republic, François Hollande and his Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, called on the French people to “sustain the spirit of 11 January” i.e. to protect the values of democracy and the Republic.

In addition to increasing the human and financial resources of the army, intelligence services, police and justice, the SIG (the Government’s information service) launched the website www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr on 28 January 2015, that presented itself as the “prevention

14. 20,000 people (according to the organisers) or 5,500 (according to police headquarters) attended a demonstration in Paris on 30 January 2016 (as well as in Toulouse, Pau, Montauban, Auch and Bayonne) in response to the call by the collective “Nous ne céderons pas” (We won’t give in) and “Stop état d’urgence” (End to the state of emergency) against the state of emergency and the stripping of nationality.
and decrypting site for radicalisation and Jihadist terrorism”, as well as ontemanipule.fr in 2016 (with the aim of informing citizens of the dangers of conspiracy theories). The PHAROS platform, created in 2009, for reporting of illegal content on the Internet, exploded with 163,000 reports in 2018, or three times more than when it was launched\(^\text{15}\). In order to strengthen republican values, the Minister of National Education, Higher Education and Research, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, announced the “mobilisation of schools for Republican values”. An Interministerial Committee “Equality and Citizenship” was also put in place. Despite a readiness to prevent radicalisation in the whole population, R. Sèze observed that prevention was refocussed around populations considered to be at risk. The public authorities then encouraged cooperation with a “civil Islam”, seen as a defence against radicalisation, by monitoring the training of Imams and the security of mosques\(^\text{16}\).

If many of these measures (and particularly the websites developed by the government) have had a limited impact, or are even forgotten about or abandoned today, it is above all the quantity of measures that seems important to look at. It speaks of a real awareness and political will to combat radicalisation.

2. In search of the miracle solution to radicalisation

In the face of a post-attack urgency, the public authorities started looking for a miracle solution to prevent radicalisation, i.e. a rapidly effective solution that, obviously, does not exist. The search would lead to numerous abuses with consequences that are still felt today. There is particular mistrust around “de-radicalisation” companies.

On 16 July 2015, the socialist deputy for Hauts-de-Seine, Sébastien Pietrasanta, submitted a report to the Prime Minister entitled “de-radicalisation, a tool in combating terrorism”\(^\text{17}\). It evoked a “pre-existing social fertile ground” and an international context that are favourable to radicalisation and notes that “the religious element is little found in radicalisation”. It recommends an individualised handling, in prison for the most dangerous, in an open environment or even in de-radicalisation centres following a legal decision. The report also suggests that the feeling of belonging in society is a barrier to radicalisation and encourages the circulation of a counter-narrative against Jihadist propaganda. The report ends with these words: “Despite all the efforts undertaken, zero risk is not possible. We are not only facing a security issue but a societal challenge. There should therefore be an overall response”.

The public authorities were thus looking for a miracle solution to compensate for the fractures at the heart of radicalisation phenomena. Some people and approaches were successively favoured in relation to others, the aim being to find the most effective remedy against radicalisation.

\(^{15}\) www.rtl.fr/actu/justice-faits-divers/pharos-10-ans-apres-retour-sur-lesucces-de-la-plateforme-de-signalements-sur-internet-7797879277 .


\(^{17}\) www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/154000455.pdf .
Many actors and projects were largely financed without solid prior checks or quality evaluation that led to many controversies as to how genuine the actions to combat radicalisation were in general. We return here to several incidents, not to target specific people, but to understand the different types of problems that arose.

The State thus financed the MPF (Family Prevention Centre) under Sonia Imloul, created in September 2014, that called on “quietist” Salafists to counter the Isis narrative. But the MPF was a failure and Sonia Imloul was convicted of misappropriation of subsidies, money laundering and undeclared work.

In September 2016, the first centre for reintegration and citizenship opened its doors in Pontourny, in Indre-et-Loire, but permanently closed a year later, in July 2017. The aim of this centre was to “prepare, propose and dispense an offer and a teaching programme (for) the reintegration of young people in the process of becoming marginalised”. It was therefore intended for radicalised individuals who hadn’t been convicted and who weren’t considered imminently dangerous. The idea was then to cut them off from their environment for 8 months, on a voluntary basis. However, the centre has been empty since February, and only 9 people had taken part (none stayed until the end of the programme). The neighbours and local officials were strongly opposed to the project. The public targeted by the centre continually changed with each opposition, and a young individual with an S file (“fiche S” for individuals considered a threat to national security) who had tried twice to reach Syria, was one of the volunteers. The confidentiality that was an essential condition promised to the individuals handled was not respected (police search after the arrest of a young person handled by the Pontourny centre, etc.), which caused the volunteers to leave. The Senate deplored the ineffectiveness of this centre, costing an annual 2.5 million euros.

In February 2016, the Imad Centre for Young People and Parents opened its doors in Garges, funded by several hundreds of thousands of euros and entrusted to Latifa Ibn Ziaten, the mother of a soldier killed by Mohammed Merah; without a real result to date.

In Sarcelles, the CIPRAD (Information Centre for Prevention of Radicalisation) has struggled to get going. Provided with several hundreds of thousands of euros, it is a partner of the AFVT (French Association of Victims of Terrorism) and the ARTEMIS association.

The millions of euros invested in “de-radicalisation” actions in prisons can be added to these experiences. They were stopped dead by PLAT due to doubts over their effectiveness: a call for projects had been launched with a budget of 7.1 million (funded by PLAT) that led to training courses with incongruous content for detainees (stroking hamsters, photo shoots mimicking war poses, etc.)

Generally-speaking, these experiences have created numerous suspicions by the public authorities and public opinion to the point that some, like journalist David Thomson, author of

---

19. Article “En prison, on navigue à vue...” by Canard Enchaîné, 30 April 2016.
the book The Returnees. They went off to do jihad, now they’re back in France\textsuperscript{20} declared that: “the de-radicalisation programmes are a masquerade\textsuperscript{21}”.

The term “de-radicalisation” was thus dropped in 2016 because, as Muriel Domenach puts it, “you can’t re-programme a person like you can re-programme a piece of faulty software”, even if an “after radicalisation” does exist. The concept of “disengagement” was preferred in the plan “Prevent to Protect” in 2018\textsuperscript{22}.

Finally, the controversies over the work of Dounia Bouzar also reflect the difficulties of partnership between the State and private partnerships on this issue. In July 2014, the CPDSI (Centre for Prevention of Sectarian Abuses Linked to Islam) under anthropologist Dounia Bouzar, was mandated to share her method of “de-recruitment” to the anti-radicality units in the prefectures. Despite real results, the collaboration between the CPDSI and the government came to an end in 2016 on the basis of political controversy: the centrist senator, Nathalie Goulet, had asked the Minister of the Interior for a report on the results of the CPDSI, doubting its effectiveness. The media coverage, employing family members and the large amounts of money received for its work, were also criticised. What is more, Dounia Bouzar was also criticised for using an informant, Farid Benyetou as well as the difficulty in quantifying results, particularly as one of the people she “de-recruited” was later arrested for trying to get to Syria. Dounia Bouzar wrote a long letter explaining her approach and the difficulties she encountered working on the subject and particularly in her relationship with government orders\textsuperscript{23}.

For most people working on the subject, the work of Dounia Bouzar remains benchmark, pioneering work and the fruit of work in the field with a large number of individuals reported for radicalisation. She is still regularly called upon by numerous institutions, public and private, in France and abroad.

3. PARTIC, a second plan to combat radicalisation and terrorism

On 9 May 2016, a second plan to combat terrorism was presented\textsuperscript{24}: PART (Action Plan to Combat Radicalisation and Terrorism), that replaced the first plan from April 2014. It included 80 measures (including 50 new). PART claimed to detect and neutralise terrorist networks, as

\textsuperscript{21} Interview by David Thomson with Le Point, on 9 December 2016: https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/david-thomson-les-programmes-de-deradicalisation-sont-une-tartufferie-09-12-2016-2089281_23.php.
\textsuperscript{22} On the different terms used by professionals, see Dounia Bouzar “Deradicalisation? Desengagement? Désistance? » in Les Cahiers de l’Orient 2019/2 (N°134), pages 7 to 36
\textsuperscript{23} To get a full idea of this controversy, we invite you to read Nathalie Goulet’s full press release (http://parti-udi.fr/le-controle-des-outils-de-lutte-contre-la-radicalisation-simpose/ ), as well as the open letter, which is very informative, that Dounia Bouzar sent in response, that can be downloaded via the following link: https://t.co/fLlbawGoqP.
\textsuperscript{24} www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/document/2016/05/09.05.2016_dossier_de_presse_-_-plan_d'action_contre_la_radicalisation_et_le_terrorisme.pdf.
well as routes to radicalisation, combat terrorism on an international scale and ensure the protection of sites considered to be vulnerable. The plan also required a strengthening of prevention provisions in an approach based on individualised handling.

This plan mixes the security paradigm with combating terrorism and prevention of radicalisation. It is no longer in effect, replaced by PACT in 2018. What is more, PLAT was replaced by the discrete Mission to Prevent Violent Radicalisation (MLRV) in 2017: this was a third plan to combat radicalisation in prisons.

C. Two distinct plans to prevent and combat terrorism

1. 2018: The plan “Prevent to Protect”

Presented in Lille on 23 February 2018, the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation (PNPR) “Prevent to protect”, is still in force today. Following the Law of 30 October 2017, that strengthened internal security and the fight against terrorism, in the face of an ever more burning terrorist threat and an increase in the number of people reported as radicalised, this plan demonstrates the importance given to prevention of radicalisation. It oriented policy on prevention of radicalisation around 60 measures, that were built around 5 policy directions:

1. Protecting minds against radicalisation.
2. Filling the gaps in the detection/prevention network.
3. Understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalisation.
4. Professionalising local actors and evaluating practices.
5. Adapting disengagement.

The plan is intended to offer a complete programme, from detection to disengagement, before (in targeting prevention at school) and after (leaving prison), as explains Muriel Domenach25.

The priority of “Prevent to Protect” is placed on action in schools (10 of the 60 measures involve schools), companies, higher education, sport, prison environments and mental health, that are considered to be the essential drivers of disengagement.

The plan concentrates on secondary and tertiary prevention. It particularly makes provisions for individuals incarcerated for radicalisation to prepare their departure from prison or their handling in an open environment. Prisons are seen as particularly sensitive as individuals are incarcerated for crimes linked to radicalisation, while others are there for common law crimes and are likely to become radicalised during their incarceration. The prison administration has put in place individual and multidisciplinary Radicalisation Evaluation Areas (QER), to orient radicalised inmates towards dedicated structures. We estimate that there are 500 inmates incarcerated for acts linked to terrorist radicalisation and around 1000 radicalised inmates.

The assumption of this plan is that “to protect our society, we need to continue to fight terrorism as well as effectively prevent radicalisation”\(^{26}\). The plan reaffirms the need for coordination between the State, public bodies and the civil society. What is more, it insists on the need for a multidisciplinary approach, i.e. psychological, social and educational\(^{27}\).

2. Today, preventing radicalisation in the face of “hybrid” profiles

A year after the launch of PNPR, Edouard Philippe went to Strasbourg to give an initial report:

- 4 independent schools, 7 places of worship, 8 cultural or associative bodies and 89 premises serving drinks, had been closed;
- around 300 foreigners who were undocumented and registered in the FSPRT (Database for the Processing of Alerts to Prevent Terrorist Radicalisation) were deported or voluntarily left France;
- “secular units” were implemented to combat threats to secularism in schools.

The new strategy was also in the context of current events as the perpetrator of the attack on the Christmas market in Strasbourg had been involved in crime since the age of 8, prior to becoming radicalised. “One of the things that the Strasbourg attack shows is that there can be a continuum being crime, radicalisation and obviously terrorism”\(^{28}\) declared the Prime Minister.

This speech also announced the preferential action areas to combat radicalisation in the years to come:

- The Republican reconquest: closure of independent schools, Salafist places of worship, cultural and charity establishments and premises selling drinks, etc., as well as work in charter schools: 350 advisers responsible for supporting school staff, school should be the place for developing a critical mind.
- Combating radicalisation in prisons: sealed areas allowing inmates convicted of terrorism or who are radicalised to be separated from other inmates, multidisciplinary evaluations, support in disengagement, etc.
- Recruitment of advisers in the sporting domain where sectarian movements considered a threat had been noticed.
- Deportation of undocumented foreigners registered in the FSPRT

---


\(^{27}\) « We cannot associate radicalisation with a mental illness. In 2015, the shock was so massive that we looked for ready-made answers that were reassuring, around a single cause. Yet experience on the ground has shown that the causes of radicalisation were multiple », declared Muriel Domenach, (www.20minutes.fr/societe/2368883-20181109-attentats-13-novembre-a-recherche-radicalisation-djihadiste-trois-ans-apres-attentats ).

There have been no less than 5 successive plans (some overlapping) and numerous laws since 2015. In addition, in order to have an overall view of the development of the various public provisions in the face of radicalisation, we suggest the following timeline:

---

### 3. Public funds to support citizen initiatives against radicalisation

In order to finance actions for the prevention of radicalisation, the public authorities have put support funds in place.

The FIPD (Interministerial Fund for the Prevention of Crime), created in 2007, was “intended to finance actions in the context of crime prevention plans and in the context of the contracts

---

29. For ease of reading, we have only retained the main reports that have had a wider impact (at policy/public opinion level) and we have excluded reports that are too specific, such as the Avia report on combating racism and Anti-Semitism on the Internet or the report on “prevention of radicalisation in schools” by deputies Mörch and Victory, published in 2018.
between the State and territorial authorities in the area of town policy. After the attacks in 2015, it was given more funding in order to finance actions to combat radicalisation, in the context of its R programme. This fund was financed by the Minister of the Interior and coordinated by the SG-CIPDR.

The circular of 28 February 2019, that indicated the directions chosen for use of FIPDR credits for 2019, specifies that several association networks working originally in the social sector and in crime prevention and support to parents, had been taken on since 2006 in prevention of radicalisation, supported by the SG-CIPDR. It indicates: “You should, as much as possible, continue relying on these wide associative networks as well as networks and associations working on women’s rights and male-female equality. “Measure 43 of the PNPR provides for establishing “a map of the training offer (...) and specifications for training bodies on prevention of radicalisation (SG-CIPDR)”.

Several other public bodies also co-finance these actions (prefectures, CAF, Prison Administration, General Commission for Territorial Equality, etc.) and are brought together as a committee of financiers, put in place by the CIPDR. The aim is that actors takes on the projects for prevention of radicalisation that link with their subject. The scope for financing for each actor is movable but communication and allocation is improving as time goes on. The difficulties that we have had in identifying the existing provisions, the amounts allocated, and the scope of financiers shows a lack of transparency on the financing put in place or supported by the public authorities for prevention of radicalisation. What is more, we have noticed, for example, that one action for prevention of radicalisation on breaking down conspiracy theories in prisons might be co-financed by DILCRAH and the FIPD in 2017 then only by the FIPD in 2018 and then be financed by the Ministry of Justice in 2019. As Johanna Barrasz, deputy delegate of DILCRAH explains: “people know us and they come to us”, which could exclude financing of some grassroots, small or isolated associations that don’t know about these provisions.

DILCRAH, that deals with discrimination, is justly one of the financiers of associative initiatives for prevention of radicalisation. Put in place a few days before the attacks of January 2015, with a budget of 4 million euros in 2014-2015 (6 million for 2019-2020) it rapidly appeared as a natural financier of actions for prevention of radicalisation. “All the associations we fund participate in establishing an ideal climate for combating radicalisation”, sums up Johanna Barasz. About ten projects for the prevention of radicalisation have been funded: these are mainly primary prevention projects that deal with topics also dealing with racism and Anti-Semitism. DILCRAH funds projects that involve combating stereotypes and prejudice, particularly by breaking down conspiracy theories. But what this subject illustrates, as we have shown, is the complexity of defining a strict scope for prevention of radicalisation actions in relation to combating discrimination. As Johanna Barrasz explains: “we are not supposed to deal with radicalisation, this is not the job of DILCRAH, but we can clearly see that we can’t deal with our issue without that as a basis”.

Conclusion: many challenges in a progressively more radicalised society

The public authorities are now confronted with many challenges for the coming years: the number of people radicalised continues to increase and the focus has been placed on prevention by the public authorities, to the detriment of other urgent questions like returning “Jihadists” and their children. On this subject, Emmanuel Macron has adopted a case by case policy, supported by public opinion\(^{32}\) and by a section of the political class\(^{33}\), which prevents the question of returnees from being addressed. Regarding the difficulty of quantifying the exact number of radicalised people in France, we can touch on the following figures and imagine that, in everyone’s opinion, the reality is much higher:

- In France, 2,500 people are being handled for radicalisation (including 55% who are minors\(^{34}\)) dont 500 including 500 people incarcerated for Islamic terrorist crimes;
- 10,500 people have S files\(^{35}\);
- 20,904 people have an FSPRT file\(^{36}\);
- Minister of Justice Nicole Belloubet announced that 450 radicalised inmates will leave prison between now and 2019 (1,200 inmates of common law offences have been reported as radicalised)\(^{37}\).

We also need to take into account the radicalised individuals who have not yet been identified or reported. We can add to this other forms of extreme violence that are progressively entering the sphere of radicalisation, according to one section of the political class and public opinion: the far right, identity-based movements, the far left, violence in the name of animal rights, offshoots of the “Yellow vests” movement. Violence in the name of these ideologies has considerably increased in 2019, in quantity as well as the level of violence, as shown by the dismantling of a very small neo-Nazi group planning to attack Jewish or Muslim places of worship and the attempted murder of the Brest Imam, Rachid El Jay, on 27 June 2019.

\(^{32}\) A survey by Odaxa-Dentsu Consulting pour Le Figaro et Franceinfo from February 2019 showed that 82% of people asked in France were in favour of French “Jihadists” being sentenced in Iraq. This same survey confirmed that 67% of people asked wanted the children of “Jihadists” to stay in Iraq and Syria.

\(^{33}\) Among the various proposals made by politicians, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan proposed reopening the detention centre in Cayenne for French “Jihadists”. Xavier Bertrand suggested returning Jihadists should be “presumed guilty”, and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen wanted to “suspend the Schengen zone” and “extend the criteria for the stripping of nationality”. The Minister for the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, had also declared in October 2017: “if Jihadists perish in combat, I would say all the better (…) What we can do is to continue this fight to neutralise as many Jihadists as possible (…) We need to follow it through”.

\(^{34}\) www.gouvernement.fr/radicalisation-aller-plus-loin-dans-la-prevention.


PART 3 • THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES OF THE WIDER ASSOCIATIVE SECTOR

A. An environment with movable boundaries

1. A complex definition of the prevention of radicalisation sector

The associations in prevention of radicalisation make up a sector with movable boundaries. Before 2015, there were practically no associations combating radicalisation in France.

This is explained in particular by the sudden funding offered to associations in the aftermath of the attacks in 2015. Numerous associations responded to the call for projects from financiers, even classing activities as “prevention of radicalisation” that weren’t necessarily that. Marc Hecker spoke of a logic of “supply and demand”, and Johanna Barasz explained that the large associations know the wording to use and vocabulary to favour “ and joked by saying: “we are presented with the same projects but they are labelled combating Anti-Semitism and racism”.

On their side, associations are sometimes pushed to meet the expectations of financiers to be able to continue to exist.

Johanna Barasz also remarked that other associations don’t solely concentrate on prevention of radicalisation but participate by creating a social link, by working on self-esteem, education in a wider sense, etc. These associations do not, however, embody the programmes by financiers on prevention of radicalisation, so they cannot receive the support.

The definition of prevention of radicalisation is an issue, which explains the difficulty in counting them.

2. Estimated figures that are difficult to obtain

There is no official number of associations working on prevention of radicalisation on which the different actors agree.

Some, like Johanna Barasz, consider that there are tens of associations for prevention of radicalisation in France, even if there are many more claiming to be. On the other side, the CIPDR mentions 90 partner associations of the prefectures. In an information report entitled “de-radicalisation” policies in France: changing the paradigm”, the senators Esther Benbass and Catherine Troendlé38 published a list of around 150 associations financed in 2015 and 2016 by the FIPD as prevention of radicalisation. DILCRAH on the other hand, while partially

at the heart of the subject, funds around 900 projects a year. If we cross-reference these figures with the 50 associations financed by the Fonds du 11 janvier and our own knowledge of the sector, we can estimate that the number of associations that work in prevention of radicalisation is several hundred. And when we talk about associations, this includes small, local associations, made up solely of volunteers and sometimes without a real budget, as well as very big national, even international associations. Thus the FIPDR was able to give 300,000 euros to the Red Cross for capacity strengthening activities in 2015 and 1,300 euros to the Béarn region judicial control association for implementing a provision on handling populations in the process of becoming radicalised.

The public authorities insist on the importance of partnerships with large associative networks in preventing radicalisation (essentially secondary prevention and a bit less of primary prevention): local branches, youth centres within the National Association of Youth Centres, the ASE (Social Aid in childhood), schools for families, specialist trainers, as well as the Association of Mayors of France, regional health agencies, the associations of French Departments. Every prefecture chooses the associations that it wants to support. These are associations of local officials, for handling socially fragile young people and for combating crime.

Beyond the public authorities, private actors also fund associations via calls for projects (Google, Facebook, etc.). According to some, like Johanna Barasz, this money is always useful as it is a necessity for the associations, but for the GAFA it is mainly to improve their image.

For information, to identify the financiers taking part in prevention of radicalisation, the associations funded by the Fonds du 11 janvier have been co-financed by the following (other than members of the Fund themselves):

- Ministries (National Education, Culture, Justice);
- Region;
- Department Council;
- City;
- CAF (Family Allowance Fund);
- General Commission for Territorial Equality;
- Company: Google.

Foundations are progressively becoming more and more interested in associations for preventing radicalisation, but the Fonds du 11 janvier has played a pioneering role in these structures.

However, it is difficult to distinguish between the associations really offering projects for prevention of radicalisation and who have a role in this, those who only present themselves as this and those who have a role in preventing the rifts at the root of radicalisation without presenting themselves as such.
B. Combating discrimination and education in republican values, common practices

Associations for prevention of radicalisation are mainly associations for combating discrimination and education on republican values. They are therefore mostly involved in primary prevention.

For example, the Fonds du 11 janvier and the programme Ensemble Face au Terrorisme (together against terrorism), by the Fondation de France, have funded several projects on developing critical thinking and decoding media information: Entre les lignes (with the AFP), Project InterClass’ (with France Inter), CinéFabrique, La ZEP. We guess therefore at a primary prevention approach that also extends towards secondary prevention.

Using various sources mobilised over the course of our study, we have determined several approaches and practices of prevention preferred by associations for prevention of radicalisation. Here is a non-exhaustive list. Each section is led by associations already in existence who have included it in their project, as well as new associations, created following development of the subject and numerous associations developing projects in several of these approaches, without always naming them in the same way. This is why it does not seem realistic to give an exhaustive list here of the associations per approach, but rather to distinguish them by major group of approach: major, minor, abandoned and emerging.

Major approaches:

• Media education: many associations for education in citizenship or combating discrimination have developed actions for education on the media, in various forms. What is more, an increasing number of associations of journalists have been created or have taken an interest in prevention of radicalisation from the perspective of critical thinking and combating “fake news”; Première Ligne, Fake Off, Entre les lignes, la ZEP, etc. It should also be noted that Google and Facebook invested enormous amounts of money in 2019 to fund this type of project: 1 million euros annually by Facebook to fund projects to combat hate speech online and 10 million euros for the Google Impact Challenge (call for projects to combat hate and extremism).

• Combating discrimination: associations combating discrimination, such as LICRA (International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism), take part in breaking down the prejudices and stereotypes that lead to violence.

• Republican/citizenship education: associations work particularly in a school environment to reinforce social cohesion around citizenship and republican values, such as Cartooning for Peace, who are also involved in education on the media.
Minor approaches:

- **Multi-faith approach:** some associations look to encourage dialogue between different religions and laity (Coexisting, Muslim Jewish Conference…).

- **Re-appropriation of religion:** some associations, like Enquête or CERESE, as well as theologians (Rachid Benzine), Imams (Tareq Oubrou), the Islamic Foundation of France (particularly since the arrival of Ghaleb Bencheikh as president in December 2018).

- **Counter-narrative:** there is no real tradition of counter-narrative in France, as Muriel Domenach explains: in France “our reflex is to talk about States rather than societies”. With the exception of some rare associations, centred on religious narrative (such as Parle moi d’Islam), the counter-narrative actions are more the fruit of very exceptional projects within an association. It should be noted that the project Seriously, run by the association Renaissance Numérique, wants to be a tool to feed a counter-narrative.

- **Cognitive/psycho-social interventions:** work on self-confidence, breaking down prejudice, etc. While the associations working on this approach are not rare in France, those that do so specifically with the aim of preventing radicalisation are largely a minority.

- **Testimonies** from professionals and young people: attack survivors, informants, families of victims or radicalised individuals, etc. There are few cases, but the spectrum is wide. We can name Latifah Ibn Ziaten, the mother of a victim of Mohammed Merah, who regularly speaks to audiences of young people and adults with her association IMAD (she is also author and/or subject of 2 books and 2 films), Véronique Roy or Lau Nova, mothers of radicalised children who regularly speak to young people and adults. Associations like French Association of Victims of Terrorism or the think Tank Action Resilience rely on testimonies from several of their members: Nicolas Hénin (ex-hostage), Mourad Benchelali (ex-detainee in Guantanamo bay). Finally, ex-Islamists like Farid Abdelkrim or David Vallat speak in a more independent way. We could also include the use of testimony from escapees of other crimes, like survivors of the Holocaust, that associations like le Mémorial de la Shoah use for educational and citizenship purposes or to combat prejudice.

- **Culture:** 10 plays on the subject were funded by the FIPDR, the most well-known being Djihad, by Ismael Saidi, seen by an audience of more than 450,000 and Lettre à Nour by Rachid Benzine, 85 performances funded in schools, prisons and cultural centres. Other plays are on offer at a grassroots level, like Ne vois-tu rien venir? by Souâd Belhaddad that is performed particularly in “apartment theatres” and that was created from a listening campaign of testimonies from citizens affected by the radicalisation of a loved one. Other plays, like Ne laisse...
personne te voler les mots by Michel André and Selman Reda (supported by the Fonds du 11 janvier et le CIPDR) are also performed in both theatres and schools. Finally, the creation of films is also more developed but difficult to count due to the number of self-productions broadcast directly online.

C. Blind spots and emerging trends

We have identified blind spots and emerging trends in the approaches and practices of associations in the prevention of radicalisation.

1. Emerging trends

- Participation by informants, (or people presenting themselves as such): this subject emerged in 2016 following the work of Médéric Chapitaux, but remains a subject that is little covered. A guide was prepared on this subject by the Minister for cities, youth and sport, as part of the government’s Action Plan to Combat Radicalisation and Terrorism of 9 May 2016 and measure 45 on prevention of radicalisation in sport. The guide confirms that actors in sport and leadership have a “role in citizen vigilance” that is both direct (direct intervention to prevent radicalisation) or indirect (in missions to raise awareness and training on the problems or in developing activities intended to promote integration that the phenomenon of radicalisation tends to call into question”). Associations like AFEV, la Ligue de l’Enseignement or Unis-Cité are today considering prevention by leaders in popular education.

- Radicalisation other than Islamic: the far right is progressively the subject of prevention projects. However, according to Johanna Barasz, the political dimension prevents public financiers from funding local associations present in far-right areas even though they do have a role in re-establishing social links.

- Projects for women: “60% of CIPDR projects target women from areas of Republican reconquest as a priority”. Projects of this type are most often found in secondary prevention.

- Prevention of radicalisation in companies is increasingly being developed in the context of PNPR, particularly through training.

- Mental health approaches are also being developed.

- The same is true for prevention of radicalisation in higher education or the civil service.

- The approach by history and memory.

42. In the press file of the CIPDR, on 23 February 2018-11 April 2019.
2. Blind spots

- **Participation by informants**, (or people presenting themselves as such): The Ministry of the Interior refuses to have such people take part in the disengagement process. They are generally separated from prevention. However, their testimonies are sometimes heard in documentaries (Exit, la vie après la haine, Radicalisation : le sort des repentis, La France face aux repentis du djihad, etc.) or in seminars (Yaseen Berouini, doctoral student at EHESS, working for the AIPER, the Centre for Analysis of political and radical Islam, who was radicalised as a teenager and now speaks to the Fondation des Sciences de l’Homme and works on disengagement), David Vallat, Farid Benyettou who wrote with Dounia Bouzar, *Mon djihad. Itinéraire d’un repenti* and who spoke to the CPDSI despite the ban from the Ministry of the Interior...

- **Prevention of radicalisation in children born or having grown up in the territory of the Islamic State**: the returnees are handled on a case by case basis for the moment (this could change at any time), 95 minors have returned (83% are under 10) and are being cared for in 23 departments and more than 500 could still be in the combat zone.

- **Prevention in suburban and rural areas**: the focus has been on the inner suburbs, but suburban and rural areas are also victim of social rifts and are often seduced by the far right. A solution could be to encourage prevention in agricultural schools (very well-structured therefore easy to engage).

- **The link with parents** still needs to be worked on. According to Rachid Benzine, school writing or theatre projects presented to parents could have a positive effect on the family link and thus prevent radicalisation. Some associations, like *Citoyenneté Possible*, suggest strengthening the parent-child link and the role of parents starting with the use of social networks and using Non-Violent Communication tools, from the perspective of prevention of radicalisation.

- **Projects on gender** are absent in primary prevention (but emerging in secondary prevention).

- **Well-being at school**: according to Lydia Ruprecht, this is a blind spot whereas “there needs to be some self-criticism about the operation of the school and the environment of young people: violence in the playground, the fact that there are too many people in classes, etc.”.

Generally-speaking, many small associations are not sufficiently funded: Marc Hecker notes that we went through a phase where money was invested en masse for initiatives that we thought would be miracle solutions (in the wake of the attacks of 13 November 2015) then the public authorities became very careful and “the pendulum swung a bit too far in the other direction” with the specifications from the FIPDR. The small associations also need contact points.

---

D. Abandoned practices

Two practices were favoured in previous years then abandoned:

- **The religious approach** in prevention of radicalisation, mainly the counter-narrative using theologians or imams (particularly in prisons). Muriel Domenach has the impression however that this approach is sometimes used again, unlike in 2015.
- **“De-radicalisation”:** while an after-radicalisation is possible, going back in time is not. According to some, the term has been overused as it was excessively employed to talk about very different realities. It has today been abandoned by all actors in prevention of radicalisation. Those who talk about coming out of radicalisation generally prefer the term disengagement.

The practices and approaches that were abandoned in just a few years testify to the difficulty for actors in radicalisation to understand this very complex phenomenon.

PART 4 • THE RESEARCH AND ACADEMIC SECTOR

The growing interest from the public authorities and the general public has had a major impact on the research and academic sector, that has taken full advantage since 2015. For the sociologist Michel Wieviorka, director of studies at EHESS and president of the Foundation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, this interest is a windfall, it is “an amazing opportunity for research”, as the subject of radicalisation has enabled the “mobilisation of research and to bring researchers to light, in a country where research had lost its position in society and its international aura”. What is more, the subject, due to its multiple causes and consequences, requires real multidisciplinary research and opens gateways between research, public opinion and public authorities.

In real terms, the research and academic sector has tackled radicalisation in the following ways:

- creation of university courses on radicalisation (University Diploma, Masters, etc.) and new positions for teacher-researchers;
- interest from university chairs;
- multiplication of publications by researchers;
- development of sources of funding offered to researchers;
- organisation of seminars;
- investment in new research fields on linked problems;
- multiplication of theses on the subject;
- explosion of the number of think tanks that deal with it (exclusively or not).
A. A windfall for research

1. Political, media and public opinion interest in this research

While in the United States, Islamic terrorism has been subject to a lot of research (particularly after the attacks of 11 September 2001), French researchers didn’t become interested in this issue and that of radicalisation straight away, but rather on subjects to do with similar issues (like violence linked to militant extremists, for example). At the start of the millennium, research on radicalisation spread gradually across Europe, always looking to better understand the phenomenon in order to effectively prevent it. France in turn found itself impacted and researchers became progressively more interested in the question of radicalisation.

This research was often in response to initiatives by public authorities, that offered funding: thus, the majority of research in France was organised by the DAP (prison administration) then by the CIPDR. Romain Sèze talks about “research-actions”, like other researchers: for a large number of these works, the aim was not simply scientific, but they above all needed to be useful in combating radicalisation in an operational way. Some university work that falls into classic research has developed alongside this research-action, and have above all touched upon the transition to radicalisation or the reasons for renouncing it; this research deals above all with the causes, always with this idea that knowing the causes of a phenomenon allows it to be better prevented. For Michel Wieviorka, this research (and research in general) does not necessarily have “a direct impact on public action, but rather an indirect impact. It should contribute to increasing the participants’ capacity for analysis.” This does not mean research with the aim of making recommendations for exiting radicalisation, for example.

The example of Practicies, a university research project oriented towards radicalisation and prevention of hate speech in young people, created in 2017, that has received 3.5 million euros from the European Commission, seems particularly enlightening to illustrate this investment by the public authorities. Its activities involve:

- “Evaluating the risk and protection factors as well as the narrative and means of propagation of ideas and radical actions for young people in European cities;
- Evaluating current practices, programmes and policies that aim to combat radicalisation, the reduction of community tensions and strengthening of social cohesion;
- Identifying good intervention practices and evaluating the possibility of using them in other cities”

44. On the evolution of the security paradigm of the public authorities, see Romain Sèze, Prévenir la violence djihadiste. Les paradoxes d’un modèle sécuritaire, Paris, Seuil, 2019, 228 p.
2. The creation of COSPRAD

COSPRAD (Scientific Council on the Process of RADicalisation) was created by decree on 3 May 2017, following recommendations in a report by ATHENA (National Alliance for social sciences and humanities). Presided over by the Prime Minister, it was made up of 11 State representatives, 4 local officials, 2 members of Parliament and 13 notable scientists. Its mission was to “encourage expression and dialogue between research and public policy, with a view to developing the structuring of research in France and to make proposals to the Prime Minister”. It is in the context of the 60 measures in the 2018 plan and was commended by Edouard Philippe in his speech in Strasbourg: “Everything we do to increase understanding, to increase knowledge, is indispensable for better action in an ever more effective way. I expect a lot from their illumination to help public decision-making”. He contrasts with the words of his predecessor, Manuel Valls, whose declaration, “explaining is already a bit like wanting to excuse” in 2016, which harmed the image of research in this area.

In 2017-2018, COSPRAD organised topical workshops to allow researchers, public actors and representatives of civil society to discuss their practices. Its projects for 2018 are:

- mapping of research on radicalisation;
- offer of 5 doctoral contracts;
- survey on field accessibility resources for research;
- surveying structures with a similar role to that of COSPRAD.

COSPRAD came together for the first time on 2 April 2019. The aim of this committee was then reaffirmed: facilitating coordination between the public authorities and research in social science and humanities, proposing axes for priority research, allowing access to sensitive data, promoting research and making it useful for public authorities. COSPRAD demonstrates the desire of public authorities to encourage research on radicalisation by creating dialogue between a team of researchers specialised in these issues and in the context of “research-action”.

3. The opening of 11,000 FSPRT files to research: an interesting source

The State Secretary to the Minister of the Interior, Laurent Nunez, announced that 11,000 FSPRT files would be made accessible to accredited researchers. These files contain extremely useful information for understanding radicalisation.

France is one of the first countries in Europe to open this very confidential type of document to researchers. However, the opening is not yet effective, and few researchers will

47. ATHENA brings together a dozen major actors in social science and humanities (CNRS, EHESS, INRA, INSERM..) to take part in “consultation and strategic cooperation between universities and research bodies”.
49. The FSPRT files (Reporting files for prevention and radicalisation of a terrorist nature) can be distinguished from S files as the latter involve individuals likely to threaten State security, for radicalised individuals as well as hooligans, far left supporters, etc., while FSPRT files only concern radicalised individuals. They were created by a decree of 5 March 2015.
be accredited. These files pose certain problems of confidentiality as the names, addresses, identities of witnesses, etc. appear in them. The readiness to open these files to researchers demonstrates a considerable investment by public authorities in research on radicalisation, if we compare it with the difficulty historians have had in accessing some archives on sensitive subjects such as the War in Algeria or the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It remains to be seen if the opening of the FSPRT files will create a precedent for other sensitive archives or whether it will remain an exception. The exceptional nature of the opening of such documents to some researchers is witness to the government’s proactive policy to improve understanding of the profiles of radicalised individuals.

4. The financing of theses

The interest in research on radicalisation and the investment by public authorities and research laboratories can also be seen from the increase in the number of theses on this subject.

Around one hundred theses were counted in 2018-2019, defended or ongoing, on the subject of radicalisation on the website theses.fr. These are theses in the following fields:

As a comparison, around 330 theses were counted for 2017-2018, around 310 for 2016-2017 and 200 for 2015-2016, with once again a dominance in humanities, social, political and legal science. COSPRAD counted close to 300 French researchers working on radicalisation issues, as well as 600 publications and 120 theses, at the end of 2018.

50. It is in any case logical that this figure is higher for 2017-2018 than for 2018-2019 that is not yet finished. This data should therefore be taken with caution.

Some theses were sometimes also funded by competitions on topics linked to radicalisation, such as the “Grand Prix de l’académie du renseignement” that rewards, in particular, “a doctoral thesis contributing to understanding and research on intelligence”\(^{52}\).

For information, we show here the share that these theses represent in all defended theses in France. While their number has seen a considerable increase (above all between 2015-2016 and 2016-2017), the share that it represents in all theses remains stable and low.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of theses in France(^{53})</th>
<th>Number of theses on radicalisation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>48,001</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>51,313</td>
<td>310 (+35%)</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017-2018</td>
<td>49,446</td>
<td>330 (+6%)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2019</td>
<td>27,105</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the wake of the attacks of 13 November 2015, the CNRS also launched “a call for proposals on all the subjects that could arise from the questions posed to our societies by the attacks and their consequences, and opening the way to new solutions - social, technical, digital” and the high number of responses (around 300) is proof of the readiness by researchers to invest in this subject. 800,000 euros were invested to finance projects in predominantly humanities and social sciences, as well as other disciplines such as mathematics, biology, chemistry and information technology\(^{54}\). Beyond the financing for theses on radicalisation as such, DILCRAH is funding two theses a year on racism, Anti-Semitism and LGBT hate crime, that sometimes also involve radicalisation mixed in with these topics.

These wide-ranging fields are therefore taking an interest in radicalisation, and young researchers are particularly interested, guided by current affairs and the possibility of funding.

**B. A momentum in research on radicalisation in 2018-2019**

1. **Abundant scientific publications**

   We can note that many scientific publications look at radicalisation:

   The CIPDR counts, just for the period 23 February 2018 to 11 April 2019, 600 publications on radicalisation. What is more, publications of reviews on radicalisation and scientific articles in more general editions or on linked topics seem to be increasingly numerous.

---


\(^{53}\)According to the website www.theses.fr.

\(^{54}\)www.cnrs.fr/fr/face-aux-attentats-un-de-mobilisation-au-cnrs.
The conferences and seminars organised in 2018-2019 found on the site radical.hypotheses look at different topics linked to radicalisation: security, the Middle-East and Muslim worlds, terrorism, defence, radical Islam, violence, religious elites, ISIS narrative, returnees, attacks, geopolitical questions in the zones controlled by Isis, role of the public authorities, evaluation areas, social networks, the media, etc. We also find, in a small way, conferences on other forms on extremism: Yellow vests, National Front, vegan extremists.

2. A professionalisation in research on radicalisation

The readiness by public authorities to promote research on radicalisation is also accompanied by a readiness to professionalise this environment. Thus, in September 2016, roles for teacher-researchers on Islamology and radicalisation were created in 6 universities selected from 27 candidates. These were:

- la Sorbonne: post of university lecturer “Islamic radicality”;
- The University of Aix-Marseille: post of teacher-researcher on Islam in the city in globalised times;
- University of Strasbourg: Degree on Islamology;
- University of Lyon: post of research engineer on the history of Islamic thought;
- École Pratique des Hautes Études: post of director of studies in Islamology, exegesis and theology of Sunni Islam.

For these 6 creations, the public authorities have invested 650,000 euros for 2016. Another selection amongst universities to create positions on topics linked to radicalisation was announced for the coming years.

Other laboratories and researchers have not devoted themselves to this issue but have simply taken an interest, like the laboratory Pacte (laboratoire de sciences sociales, CNRS-Université Grenoble Alpes and Sciences Po Grenoble) that devoted a study day to this topic in March 2018, entitled “Terrorism and radicalisation: new perspectives”.

Professionalising shows that radicalisation is becoming a research field in its own right and that we want to have specialists in these subjects.

3. An explosion of think tanks and the appearance of “do tanks”

In France there were 46 think tanks in 2016, according to the European think tank observatory. The term designates groups of experts or people of good will producing studies and formulating proposals on various causes. In France, the phenomenon dates back to the 1980s (IFRI was the first French think tank, created in 1979), and has seen a growing increase since the 1990s. Over the period studied, numerous think tanks have devoted works to radicalisation, and new think tanks were specifically created to study radicalisation.

55. In 2012, 6,603 think tanks were recorded worldwide. The peak of their development was the middle of the 1990s during which close to 150 think tanks were being created annually. Since then, the rhythm has slowed down in the United States (country that has the most) but has accelerated in France.
phenomena. We have also recently been talking about “do tanks” to qualify structures that mix theoretical research and experiments in the field, particularly on the question of radicalisation. The term appeared at a summit against violent extremism in 2011 in Dublin, organised by Google Ideas, that looked at the means of preventing radicalisation and “deradicalising” radicalised individuals.

Below is a list of think tanks that are interested in radicalisation or that were created to deal with this topic:

- **l’INHESJ** (National institute for studies on security and justice);
- **Vers le Haut**: think tank dedicated to young people and education, several works on radicalisation were published from 2017;
- **IFRI** (French Institute for international relations) published works on radicalisation from 2015;
- **Sport et Citoyenneté** published a summary note “the position of sport in combating radicalisation”, on 8 February 2016;
- **Liberté et Prospective** regularly leads workshops on radicalisation (“radicalisation in education”, “radicalisation in sport”, “Elected officials in the face of radicalisation”, radicalisation and de-radicalisation in prison, what solutions?”, “Radicalisation in companies”, “Cyber-radicalisation”);
- **Action Résilience** is a think tank that was created in 2017 specifically on radicalisation and terrorism, doubled up with an SAS (joint-stock company) that provides training on the subject;
- **the CAT** (Terrorist Analysis Centre) is a think tank that analyses terrorism and has published works on radicalisation since 2014;
- **the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique** is a centre of expertise on international security and defence, that has published works on radicalisation since 2006;
- **the CIRA** (Youth ambassadors) has a radicalisation and terrorism section.

4. A readiness to offer training on the issues of radicalisation

The appearance of masters degrees, university diplomas, chairs and seminars devoted to radicalisation and linked topics demonstrates a readiness to train students and professionals on the issues of radicalisation. The main training courses given within universities are:

- **At the University Paris Diderot** the CERT (Study centre for radicalised individuals and their handling) created in 2017, that offers training on issues of radicalisation and terrorism and in particular a University Diploma “Radicalisation and terrorism: a multidisciplinary approach” since 2018 and an FND (non-graduate training) “Radicalisation and terrorism: subjective domains and clinical approach”;
- **the CNAM** offers a master’s degree in Criminology, Intelligence, Radicalisation, Terrorism as well as a specialisation certificate “Prevention of radicalisation”, both within UFR Criminology;
- **In 2016, CNRS** offered a themed course “Process and routes to radicalisation”;
• l’université de la Réunion has offered a University Diploma “Radicalisation: policy, clinical, therapy logics”, for health, education, justice and social work professionals, since June 2019;
• l’université Toulouse – Jean-Jaurès offers a 3-day placement in prevention of radicalisation for professionals in leadership and education, elected officials, digital specialists, security and/or reception desk staff;
• l’université Rennes 2 has offered a Clinical Training course on radicalisation and fanaticism since September 2017

These courses are intended for students, professionals and elected officials. While they show a real desire to train and a readiness by public authorities to professionalise actors in connection with radicalisation, Johanna Barasz underlines that if the target of training is to train the majority of professionals, it remains extremely costly. If we consider that 3 days of training costs around 600 euros for one person, and that there are between 8 and 10 million professionals to train, the target is very far from being achieved.

The dates of creation that we have sometimes been able to obtain show that most training courses were created between 2017 and today.

C. The impacts of this momentum for research

1. Multidisciplinary experiences

A wide range of study fields have taken on the topic of radicalisation and this “not necessarily according to each field”, according to Michel Wieviorka. Multidisciplinary teams have formed out of the fact that radicalisation is a phenomenon that is social, psychological, linked to history, etc. The graph on the fields of theses on radicalisation for 2018-2019 shows this multidisciplinary aspect (see above). Multidisciplinary research is generally rare in France but on issues such as radicalisation, Michel Wieviorka remarks that it works quite well, particularly in his institution, the FMSH, where “People are not defined by their field”, even if a certain esprit de corps can sometimes be found in some fields, like psychoanalysis, that has been renewed by the subject of radicalisation, according to Michel Wieviorka. Thus, the general assembly of “shrinks” on radicalisation that was held in Paris from 7 to 10 November 2018, had great success and a wide resonance, with 90 psychiatrists, psychologists and psychotherapists, close to 500 participants and about a dozen recommendations were formulated56. These general assemblies have allowed specialists to discuss the advances in research since the attacks in 2015 and to reaffirm the need for a multidisciplinary approach in the support for radicalised individuals.

Since 2015, the situation of research on radicalisation has seen a real development. According to psychiatrist Guillaume Monod57: “Very quickly, a ton of people declared

themselves experts without having met any Jihadists. Today, the subject has become a real university field." 

2. A risk of reaching saturation point?

The sudden interest in radicalisation issues, punctuated by the demand from public authorities and the increase in funding, is however not without risk and poses the question of longevity and saturation.

Marc Hecker talks of an “explosion of offer and demand” for research on radicalisation, that supposes that when funding becomes less plentiful the research on radicalisation will also become rarer. Islamic expert Rachid Benzine considers in turn, that training on radicalisation is an answer to the urgency but in 4-5 years they will no longer necessarily be useful and coveted by students. There are many theses on the subject but few university positions that correspond, which will certainly create a reduction in specialisation on radicalisation.

The question is raised of continuity of these university courses, of these research labs and think tanks specialised in radicalisation. This seems to depend on current events as well as the funding that is available. The funding is public for universities but there are also private funding sources (the French Institute for international relations (IFRI), for example, is 75% funded by the private sector). As a result, the number of publications on topics linked to radicalisation in the coming years also depends on these factors. Finally, Michel Wieviorka warns of the difficulty of renewing the subject: “we soon risk being at saturation point, the added value of each one will become less and less significant and we risk repetition”.

3. Blind spots and emerging trends

In research on radicalisation, there are certain blind spots, while some approaches are abandoned, and others are gradually emerging.

The blind spots and emerging trends identified in the research on radicalisation are:

- The exit from violence: this is a subject invested in by NGOs, consultants, politicians, but not yet enough by research, according to Michel Wieviorka. His team is currently working on analysing actors working on the exit from violence rather than the process of exiting violence itself.
- The position of religion in radicalisation and de-recruitment.
- The prism of research on radicalisation is Jihadism, this research covers very little other radicalisations (far right, vegan extremists, etc.).
- Evaluations of structures put in place by public authorities for the prevention of radicalisation (these evaluations are very complicated, considering that they can only be effective in the long term). The multidisciplinary and international platform project on violence and the exit from violence by Michel Wieviorka could give rise

to a serious evaluation, according to Johanna Barasz.

- Some research on the links between migration and radicalisation, a subject that is still inconceivable in France, according to Johanna Barasz. However, it should be documented so as to be able to respond in the case of attacks by the far right on this issue, as is already the case in several European countries, particularly in Germany.
- The polarisation of society and radicalisation as a social consequence (solitude, unemployment, etc.).

PART 5 • VIEWS FROM ABROAD

A. Different terminology

Internationally, like in France, the terms used to qualify radicalisation are subject to debate.

The expression used by UNESCO to name radicalisation is “Violent Extremism” (VE) and the prevention of radicalisation corresponds to PVE (Prevention of Violent Extremism). The term “radicalisation” is not used, that Lydia Ruprecht, manager of programmes on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Education in World Citizenship and Peace by UNESCO explains by: “even if the United States is no longer a member of UNESCO, we have kept their vision: we cannot risk infringing freedom of expression and belief and an approach should be favoured that is based on rights”. You can find the expression “radicalisation leading to violent extremism”. The expression “Violent Extremism” designates, for UNESCO, a political extremism (Islamic radicalisation being considered an “Islamisation of politics”) and PVE only involves prevention and not the security dimension.

The expression “Hate Speech” is starting to replace the expression “Violent Extremism”, particularly in secondary prevention. To qualify the exit from radicalisation, the expression used by UNESCO, as well as in the RAN network is “Exit”. We also talk about “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE) to designate combating radicalisation that can include the security and legal dimensions as well as sometimes a counter-narrative.

B. A world tour of characteristics

1. Different approaches...

There are many different approaches to radicalisation within the same country and within a region and, without claiming to be exhaustive, there are some characteristics and trends that emerge.
The definition of violent extremism itself differs from country to country: for France and other western countries, the policies and actions combating “Violent Extremism” cover almost exclusively Islamic radicalisation, which has very recently started gradually changing in France. In other countries, like Germany and the Nordic countries, VE also describes left- and right-wing extremism.

- In Central Asia, many States often treat minority Muslim populations as extremists.
- In Latin America, Violent Extremism also includes organised crime violence. Technically speaking, there are numerous similarities between gangs and groups of radicalised individuals.
- In Africa, the ethnic dimension is more present than the political dimension in extreme violence. Beyond ideology, political conflicts are based on accusations of corruption made against States (Nigeria, Somalia, etc.) the illegitimacy of governments, problems with justice, etc. The religious dimension is little present in societal conflicts. The dominant issue, according to UNESCO, is demilitarisation and combating the use of child soldiers.

The main difference in the approaches to PVE is whether all forms of political radicalisation are included or only Islamic radicalisation.

The position of religion

The position of religion in the approach to prevention of radicalisation is also divisive. There are several trends and the approach by religious education or religious knowledge was one of the pillars of PVE, even though it has been abandoned as time has gone on. Thus, Senegal does not include religious education in the school system but does have a system to monitor religious education. In Pakistan, religious education is a parallel system with its own universities. There is a readiness, however, to secularise these courses as the people who take them are often cut off from the rest of society as they have only known religious education. This is one of the rare subjects dealt with by UNESCO that doesn’t fit into the developing/developed country divide. The researcher Sofia Koller⁵⁹ confirms that the focus is not on religion in the prevention of radicalisation in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, but the approach is individualised and involves human rights, freedoms, critical thinking, integration and combating discrimination. She insists on the importance of social insertion in prevention (combating solitude, unemployment, etc.).

2. ... shared in international networks

The various practices and approaches to prevention of radicalisation are discussed between several countries thanks to networks and structures like RAN network and UNESCO in particular. While UNESCO represents the positions of States and is aimed at all actors in Education, the

---

⁵⁹. Research fellow in the project “Fight against terrorism and prevention of violent extremism” in the German Council on Foreign Relations.
RAN network (Radicalisation Awareness Network) “puts practitioners in contact across Europe who work directly and on a daily basis with individuals exposed to a risk of radicalisation, as well as those who have already been radicalised. Whether they are teachers, social workers or police agents, to give just a few, they are committed to preventing and combating radicalisation and violent extremism in all its forms, or to reintegrating violent extremists”. More than 5,000 professionals from all EU Member States have joined RAN since its creation in 2011.

Within Unesco, the education sector was the first to deal with this issue after the attacks in 2015 and it coordinates Unesco’s PVE policy, in its section Global Citizenship, PVE, the Holocaust and Human Rights Education. The approach favoured by Unesco revolves around education, peace, cohabitation, coexistence, as well as harassment, the role of passive witnesses and combating corruption (where radicalisation is interpreted as a consequence of a crisis of confidence in institutions). Unesco is increasingly looking at how to make the prevention of extreme violence an educational action rather than prevention of a crime. Secondary prevention is pre-emerging in Unesco’s reflections (a paper on reporting young radicalised individuals is currently in progress). This return is due to a readiness to come back to education rather than staying in Unesco’s almost CVE approach.

Research is also a way of sharing at an international level. The research field on prevention of radicalisation is recent and the dialogue between research fields and researchers still needs to be developed. In 2017, Unesco opened a “Chair on the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism” for this reason. It is working “on developing knowledge in the area of prevention of radicalisation and on better ties between research and action on the ground”. The aims of the Chair are:

• “To identify and connect the hubs and structures with expertise, so as to facilitate providing and exchanging knowledge on prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism […]
• To establish a programme of research-action concerning the prevention of radicalisation. […]
• To support the strengthening of capacities, particularly in the South […]
• To ensure awareness-raising, visibility and knowledge transfer with the public and the media”.

We can sense a considerable demand for research on the issue of violent extremism. Multidisciplinary research centres with an international scope are developing, funded by the United States (such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum-Hedayah), as well as think tanks (the club de Madrid funds studies, the International Strategic Dialogue, etc.), foundations, thesis grants, etc. Many research centres have been reorganised around this issue. In Africa, particularly Senegal, there is a significant demand from public authorities and research centres

61.ww usherbrooke.ca/recherche/fr/regroupements/chaires-institutionnelles/chaire-unesco-en-prevention-de-la-radicalisation-et-de-lextremisme-violents/.
are progressively devoting themselves to the issue of factors leading to violent extremism. According to Lydia Ruprecht: “there is a thirst for knowledge on what is working and what should be done or not done”.

These spaces of international dialogue allow collective reflections between professionals in different countries, however not all countries are involved, and France is particularly absent in these exchanges.

C. What others are doing that we aren’t

Some practices and approaches are commonplace in neighbouring countries but are absent in France. This can be explained by differences in geopolitical, political, social and cultural contexts. The organisation and structure of a country also explains why one approach is favoured and why another approach isn’t, in the same way as its history and more specifically its colonial history, as the question of memory has a major role in prevention, according to Sofia Koller.

The essential differences are found in the relationship with secularism and the position of religion in prevention of radicalisation. According to Lydia Ruprecht: “France could benefit from understanding where these young people who are radicalised by religion come from. There is a lot to learn from an international dialogue, but most often France does not initiate it, and takes part only when invited”.

What is more, as evoked above, the term “radicalisation” designates almost systematically the Islamist radicalisation in France, to the detriment of other forms of radicalisation that are, however, very present.

Another practice that exists in some countries and that is almost absent in France is the use of informants in the process of exiting radicalisation. The member countries of the RAN network agree on the refusal to have informants of “Jihad” take part in the radicalisation exit programmes of other radicalised individuals. In Germany and in Canada, informants take part in the exit from far-right radicalisation and neo-Nazism (the Centre for prevention of radicalisation leading to violence in Quebec, the network Against Violent Extremism, the association Exit in Germany). In England, the foundation Quilliam and the Active Change Foundation have been created by ex-Jihadists, but they only handle prevention of radicalisation and not disengagement. Nonetheless, the use of informants seems to be less problematic than it is in France. France is, however, not drastically late on this issue. Lydia Ruprecht remarks that while the question of informants seems to be legitimate in PVE, it has never been discussed by Unesco. It could be useful to recall here that the use of informants is a practice that we find more easily in other contexts (ex-criminals, drug addicts, etc.) but with the same ends and sometimes the same population (schools, prisons, etc.).
D. France seen from abroad

France intrigues many countries as it has been hit several times by terrorism over the last few years. Its responses to the attacks and to radicalisation are therefore observed by neighbouring countries (Unesco has thus welcomed delegations of different countries who are curious to understand how the problem of radicalisation has been dealt with in France). It is considered as a “archetype” according to Lydia Ruprecht, and the French secular model sometimes serves as a basis for others to decide what they are looking for and what they wish to avoid. France’s approach is seen as being based on security and repression more than education and prevention.

Paradoxically, it was absent from dialogue at an international level. France is under-represented in the events organised by the RAN and in the PVE programmes by Unesco. France financed a post with Unesco, it is a member of a PVE group, but it has not released funds for this subject. It does, however, invest in PVE in the Sahel region, financing the training of teachers, supporting the public authorities in the preparation of national plans, etc. Lydia Ruprecht qualifies her words, however, by specifying that the education on citizenship that France insists upon, testifies all the same to their implication in the prevention of radicalisation, but it does not try to make its practices known in other countries. Sofia Koller particularly deplored, during our interview, the lack of Franco-German cooperation on prevention projects.
The paths taken by the different actors in prevention of radicalisation in France since 2015 are sometimes identical, sometimes parallel or opposed, but the word that comes back the most often is “professionalisation”. The fear (the pressure?) of zero risk, the risk of funding or legitimising an unreliable actor are consequences of the past that lead to a much stricter and more binding regulatory framework, particularly for small associations. And this context is unfortunately not a foolproof safeguard.

Within this panorama, foundations may be the structures that enjoy greater freedom, of reflection and of action, being neither public actors, nor depending on public authorities.

A few questions should be asked here, in particular in terms of positioning. Faced with the complexity of the subject of prevention of radicalisation, the difficulty in defining the scope or agreeing on the nature of the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, many actors in prevention of radicalisation have refocussed themselves on prior prevention work and particularly on education on critical thinking. While this approach is fully pertinent and coherent, its added value becomes more relative in an area that is increasingly addressed by associations and financiers, both public and private (particularly Google and Facebook). Among the lessons that we draw from this study, we want to underline here several points that were already evoked in these pages:

• The most developed approaches by different actors involved in prevention of radicalisation are education on citizenship, education on the media and critical thinking and combating discrimination.
• The blind spot of the different practices that seems the most pertinent to address is the support for multidisciplinary actions (or their promotion). While it is not easy, in France, to get different professions to work together (teachers, social workers, associations, universities, etc.), radicalisation is a subject that, by the scale of its impact, particularly requires a multidisciplinary response or, at least, a dialogue between different actors in contact with the general public.
• The actors working on education in critical thinking, should keep in mind that this subject is increasingly targeted. It might therefore be interesting to attach this to emerging topics that are broader, such as prevention of violent extremism, hate speech or anything that relates to combating harassment, humiliation or for well-being at school, as tools that let young people also combat radicalisation.
• Finally, an assumption of this study that involved studying the actors in the field and that of research at the same time, would merit receiving support or promotion of the link between action and research, which happens particularly in think tanks.

Should we go where the need is? The demand? Should we follow an intuition? A person? Should we go back to the initial framework of the subject of all actors, or does the question of radicalisation change this framework? In the face of this panorama which is in constant evolution and the questions it poses; every person will find their own answer and we invite them to consider their own added value in order to act in the best possible manner.
• List of associations supported by the Fonds du 11 janvier between 2015 and 2019

ACLEFEU
   Association pour la formation, la prévention et l’accès au droit (AFPAD)

Association de prévention du parc de la Villette (APSV)

Association Stéphanaise pour la prévention individuelle et collective (ASPIC)

Bibliothèques Sans Frontières

Cartooning for Peace

Cie Tamerantong

Citizen Press

Citoyenneté Possible

Coexister

Coopérative Indigo

École nouvelle de la citoyenneté

École supérieure de journalisme de Lille

Efficience 59

Enjeux d’enfants – Grand Ouest

Enquête

Entre Les Lignes

Espoir 18

Fraternité générale

Fédération sportive et gymnique du travail (FSGT)

Halté à la N

Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)

Initiatives et Changement

Interclass’ (France Inter)

Innovation

J’ouvre l’œil

Khiasma

Le BAL

Le CERESE

Les Déclencheurs

Les Petits Citoyens

Le Retour de Zalumée

LICRA ARA

LICRA Reims

LICRA

Mémorial de la Shoah

Observatoire du conspirationnisme

Par le Monde

RAJE

Renaissance numérique

Rencontres audiovisuelles

SOS Racisme

SynLab

Théâtre de la Cité

Unismed

Voisins Malins

Zone d’expression prioritaire (ZEP)
Le Centre français des fonds et des fondations works on regrouping donation and foundation funds. It is aimed at helping sector knowledge, encouraging development and representing the common interests for the benefit of public good.

Fondation Alter et Care is a family foundation that supports projects combating exclusion and the precarity of persons in great difficulty in France, regardless of whether they are of a family, social, economic or cultural type.

Fondation Caritas France — First shelter foundation dedicated to combating poverty and exclusion in France and worldwide. It supports projects for the basic needs of the most fragile people, innovative projects, initiatives by the Economie Sociale et Solidaire (Social Economy), etc.

Fondation Daniel et Nina Carasso under the aegis of the Foundation of France, it develops, supports, accompanies and links women and men who dare to see and build an alternative world by supporting projects in France and in Spain, in connection with sustainable food and citizen artwork.

Fondation Financière de l’Échiquier acts in France for people in social and professional difficulty. It supports projects for education, inclusion through work and combating major social exclusion. It is the origin of the Maisons des Jeunes Talents, a programme for the equality of opportunities.

Fondation de France – First philanthropic network in France, the Fondation de France brings together all territories, donors, founders, volunteers and actors in the field. It provides the individual support needed for their action to be the most effective possible. And this is in all areas of public good: assistance for vulnerable people, medical research, environment, culture, education, etc.

Fondation Hippocrène – Recognised as of public utility, a family and independent foundation, the Fondation Hippocrène works to build a real European citizenship, day by day, by young Europeans. It supports concrete projects by or for young Europeans in all areas that allow dialogue and sharing at the service of a common European citizenship.

Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah (Foundation for Memorial of the Holocaust) – Private foundation recognised as of public utility; the Foundation for Holocaust Memorial was created in 2000. Its funds come from the return of unclaimed assets from the dispossession of French Jews. The Foundation supports projects of all kinds in history, teaching and memory of the Holocaust. Its missions also concern solidarity towards the survivors of Anti-Semitic persecution during the Second World War and the preservation of the Jewish culture that the Nazis wanted to destroy. It also supports projects combating Anti-Semitism and favouring intercultural dialogue. Since its creation, the Foundation funded more than 4000 projects.

Fondation Mérieux – family foundation. Its action is based on long-standing expertise in clinical biology and an overall approach to public health issues, with one objective: combating, on the ground, infectious diseases that impact developing countries.

Fondation SNCF – For the last 20 years, the SNCF Foundation has supported charity
projects in 3 areas: education, culture and solidarity. It supports projects on diversity, cohesion and the practice of citizenship, educational actions within two programmes: basic knowledge and awareness of science and techniques and initiatives that open up culture, the practice of a discipline and the creation of artwork.

Thalys – Thalys International is a consortium of railway companies transporting passengers between France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands around the Paris - Brussels axis. Thalys is also a Franco-Belgian registered trademark.
In the years since the 2015 terrorist attacks, what have the approaches and practices been in the prevention of radicalisation in France?

While the first few years were marked by mistakes, experiments, trial and error, abandoning and a move towards professionalisation by the public authorities as well as civil society, what is the situation today?

“And for tomorrow? While the prevention of radicalisation in France has long consisted of preventing young people from going to Syria, how is this aim changing to deal with the end of the Islamic State in its State form? In addition, the violent action by individuals from the far right against mosques and synagogues means a shift in the very scope of radicalisation as it is conceived of and presented by public policies and the media.

This study identifies the major, minor, emerging or abandoned trends, as well as the blind spots in the prevention of radicalisation in France today. After a detailed presentation of public policies since 2014, the study shows how the associative sector and the research and academic sector have addressed the subject. Finally, the study comes to an end by comparing this with approaches in different countries.

This study aims at being a tool to support financiers and decision-makers in their reflection on the subject, as well as to help actors in the prevention of radicalisation to position themselves and position their practice in an area that is constantly changing.”